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TATES' and nations' laws collide when foreign factors appear in a
lawsuit. Nonresident litigants, incidents outside the forum, parallel
lawsuits, and judgments from other jurisdictions can create
problems with personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition of
foreign judgments. This article reviews Texas conflicts cases from Texas
state and federal courts during the Survey period from October 1, 2006,
through September 30, 2007. The article excludes cases involving federal-
state conflicts, intrastate issues such as subject matter jurisdiction and
venue, and conflicts in time, such as the applicability of prior or subse-
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quent law within a state. State and federal cases are discussed together
because conflict of laws is mostly a state law topic except for a few consti-
tutional limits resulting in the same rules applying to most issues in state
and federal courts. 1
Although no data are readily available to confirm this, Texas is no
doubt a primary state in the production of conflict of laws precedent.
This results not only from its size and population, but also from its place-
ment; it borders four states, a civil-law nation, and is a hub for interna-
tional shipping. Among the states, only California shares these factors,
with the partial exception of the states bordering Quebec. Texas courts
experience the entire range of conflict of laws litigation. In addition to a
large number of opinions on garden-variety examples of personal juris-
diction, Texas courts produce case law every year on Internet-based juris-
diction, prorogating and derogating forum selection clauses, federal long-
arm statutes with nationwide process, international forum non con-
veniens, parallel litigation, international family law issues, and private
lawsuits against foreign sovereigns. The topics of interstate and interna-
tional judgment recognition and enforcement offer fewer annual exam-
ples, possibly a sign of their administrative nature which results in only a
few reported cases.
Texas state and federal courts provide a fascinating study of conflicts
issues every year, but the volume of case law now greatly exceeds the
Survey's ability to report on them, a function both of journal space and
authors' time. Accordingly, this Survey period's article focuses on a se-
lect number of cases.
I. FORUM CONTESTS
Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires amenabil-
ity to Texas jurisdiction and receipt of proper notice. Amenability may
be established by consent (usually based on a contract's forum selection
clause), waiver (failing to make a timely objection), or extraterritorial
service of process under a Texas long-arm statute. Because most aspects
of notice are purely matters of forum law, this article will focus primarily
on issues relating to amenability.
A. CONSENT AND WAIVER
Contracting parties may agree to a forum selection clause designating
either an optional or exclusive site for litigation or arbitration. When a
contracting party sues in the designated forum, the clause is said to be a
prorogation clause, that is, one supporting the forum's jurisdiction over
the defendant. When a contracting party sues in a non-selected forum in
violation of the contract, the clause is said to be a derogation clause, that
1. For a thorough discussion of the role of federal law in choice-of-law questions, see
RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 649-95 (4th ed. 2001).
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is, one undermining the forum's jurisdiction. 2
In re AutoNation, Inc., involved both personal jurisdiction and choice-
of-law issues in a parallel litigation setting.3 Hatfield began working for
AutoNation's Houston outlet in 2002 as an at-will general manager. A
year later AutoNation required Hatfield to sign a "Confidentiality, No-
Solicitation/No-Hire and Non-Compete Agreement" as a condition of
employment. The agreement included a choice-of-law clause and a forum
selection clause, both selecting Florida. Hatfield left AutoNation in Janu-
ary 2005 for a position with a competing Mercedes-Benz dealership in
Houston.4
AutoNation sued Hatfield in Florida a month later, seeking enforce-
ment of the non-compete agreement. Hatfield and his new Texas em-
ployer then sued AutoNation in Texas for a declaratory judgment that the
non-compete clause was governed by Texas law and was unenforceable.
Hatfield also sought an anti-suit injunction against the Florida action.
AutoNation moved to dismiss the Texas action because of the Florida
forum clause, and alternatively, moved to stay the Texas suit in favor of
the first-filed Florida action. The Texas trial court found for Hatfield,
denying AutoNation's motion to stay the Texas case and enjoining
AutoNation from pursuing the Florida case. AutoNation sought both an
accelerated appeal and mandamus from the court of appeals, which were
both denied. AutoNation then petitioned the Texas Supreme Court for
mandamus relief.5
Hatfield argued that a DeSantis analysis compelled both Texas litiga-
tion and invalidation of the Florida non-compete agreement. 6 The su-
preme court disagreed, distinguishing this case as turning on a forum
clause rather than a choice-of-law clause, even though both were present
here. The supreme court noted that Hatfield did not demonstrate fraud,
overreaching, or undue hardship that would provide an exception of the
rule that forum-selection clauses are generally honored.
7
The supreme court pointed to 2004 precedent that established that
even where Texas statutory provisions specify the application of Texas
law, those provisions are irrelevant to the enforceability of a forum-selec-
tion clause where no statute requires suit be brought or maintained in
2. See EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 466-69 (3d ed. 2000); James P.
George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 769, 924 (1999).
3. 228 S.W.3d 663, 678 (Tex. 2007).
4. Id. at 665.
5. Id. at 664-66.
6. In DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990), Florida-based Wack-
enhut sued former Texas employee DeSantis to enforce a non-compete agreement to pre-
vent him from starting up a rival business. The parties' non-compete agreement was
enforceable under Florida law, which was expressly designated in the parties' contract. Id.
at 678. In a classic application of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187
(1971), the Texas Supreme Court held that non-compete agreements as strict as Wacken-
hut's violated Texas public policy, which overrode the parties' contractual choice of law.
Id. at 680-81.
7. In re AutoNation, 228 S.W.3d at 668.
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Texas.8 The supreme court found the parties' bargained-for agreement
required judicial respect and "should be heard in the first-filed Florida
action, as the parties explicitly contracted."9 The supreme court also
stated, "[W]e will not presume to tell the forty-nine other states that they
cannot hear a non-compete case involving a Texas resident-employee and
decide what law applies, particularly where the parties voluntarily agree
to litigate [elsewhere].' 10 The supreme court directed the trial court to
dismiss the case in favor of first-filed Florida suit.1
In other forum clause cases, Texas courts addressed the issue of
whether successor corporations can enforce a forum clause; 12 the corol-
lary question of whether successors or subsidiaries are bound by forum
clauses; 13 and yet another corollary question of whether spouses are
bound. 14 Another court refused to enforce a forum clause designating
Lake County, Illinois, where the contract was signed and the services
were performed in Dallas.1 5
B. INTERNET-BASED JURISDICTION
A number of American jurisdictions, including Texas and the Fifth Cir-
cuit, apply the Zippo sliding scale to assess personal jurisdiction based on
Internet contacts. The test breaks down internet use into a spectrum of
three areas. One end of the spectrum finds defendants clearly doing busi-
ness in the forum based on contracts entered into with forum residents; at
the spectrum's other end are passive websites not involving defendants'
intentional contact with the forum and not leading to jurisdiction. The
spectrum's difficult middle involves the forum resident's exchange of in-
formation with the defendants' host computer, with jurisdiction based on
the level of interactivity and the commercial nature of the information
exchange. 16 Five cases during the Survey period considered internet con-
8. Id. at 669 (citing In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2004)).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 670.
11. Id.
12. Deep Water Slender Wells, Ltd. v. Shell Int'l Exploration & Prod., Inc., 234
S.W.3d 679, 686-87 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. filed) (enforcing a forum
clause designating the Hague, Netherlands, on behalf of a non-party to the contract who
was the successor company to the original contracting party).
13. CNOOC Se. Asia Ltd. v. Paladin Res. (SUNDA) Ltd., 222 S.W.3d 889, 894-95(Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (binding successor corporations to a forum clause,
but not non-signatory subsidiaries).
14. St. Clair v. Brooke Franchise Corp., No. 2-06-216-CV, 2007 WL 1095554, at *2.4(Tex. App.-Fort Worth, Apr. 12, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)(holding that non-signatory spouse was not bound by a forum clause in spite of her signing
a "Consent of Spouse" form).
15. In re Int'l Profit Ass'n, No. 05-07-00454-CV, 2007 WL 1866894, at *1 (Tex. App.-
Dallas June 29, 2007, orig. proceeding).
16. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa.
1997). The Fifth Circuit adopted the Zippo test in Mink v. AAAA Dev., L.L.C., 190 F.3d
333, 336 (5th Cir. 1999). Intermediate Texas appellate courts have used it as well; see
Townsend v. Univ. Hosp., 83 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied); Exper-




tacts as a basis for specific personal jurisdiction.
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Miraglia,17 a California resident
was subject to Texas jurisdiction for Yahoo website postings. In that case,
Miraglia, a California resident, posted information on a Yahoo! website
that disparaged Texas-based First Cash Financial Services, Inc. The post-
ings were directed at First Cash's shareholders, officers, and directors,
who were all Texas residents. When these postings resulted in two defa-
mation suits in Texas against Miraglia, State Farm provided his defense
based on his homeowner's insurance policies while still reserving a claim
of non-coverage. State Farm then filed this action for a declaration that it
had no duty to indemnify. 18
In denying Miraglia's challenge to Texas jurisdiction for State Farm's
claim, the court found that the Yahoo! website was not passive. 19 In-
stead, it had an interactive bulletin board where users could post informa-
tion and, when others responded, the original poster would receive the
responses. Miraglia's comments were directed at Texas residents, and he
should have reasonably anticipated being haled into Texas courts.20 As
for fair play and substantial justice-the balancing of convenience and
interest factors-the two defamation lawsuits were both being litigated in
Texas. In addition, Texas had an interest in the indemnification issues
involved. If the suit were litigated in California, as Miraglia requested,
there was no guarantee State Farm would obtain full relief since the par-
ties would not be bound to a California judgment.21
In other Internet jurisdiction cases, Texas courts found no jurisdiction
in a trademark claim by a New York plaintiff regarding two steak restau-
rants in Nevada;22 in a second trademark and cybersquatting claim by a
Dallas plaintiff against a California defendant who had no Texas connec-
tions at all other than the fact this his web activity could be accessed in
Texas;23 in a third trademark action for the energy drink "Deezel" by a
Houston-based plaintiff against a California defendant; 24 and in a Texas
resident's negligence claim for a personal injury occurring in South Caro-
lina, against an Alabama forklift leasing company who the court found
had never leased equipment in Texas through their website.
25
17. No. 4:07-CV-013-A, 2007 WL 2963505 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2007).
18. Id. at *1, *34.
19. Id. at *3.
20. Id. at *4.
21. Id.
22. See Glazier Group, Inc. v. Mandalay Corp., No. H-06-2752, 2007 WL 2021762, at
*11 (S.D. Tex. July 11, 2007).
23. See Drive Fin. Servs., LP v. Ginsburg, No. 3:06-CV-1288-G, 2007 WL 2084113, at
*6-7 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2007).
24. Optimal Beverage Co., Inc. v. United Brands Co., Inc., No. H-06-1386, 2007 WL
654614, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2007).




C. OTHER JURISDICTION CASES
IRA Resources, Inc. v. Griego was an action against California-based
defendants for participating in an illegal sale of securities in Texas.26 In
2001, Martinez, a Texas resident, approached Griego, also a Texas resi-
dent, about investing in "Customer Owned Coin Operated Telephones,"
a scheme in which Griego would purchase public pay phones from Amer-
ican Telecommunications Company in return for a share of the profits.
Griego used $25,500 of his retirement account to fund this, which Marti-
nez arranged for him through IRA Resources and Eldorado Bank, both
located in California. When the investment eventually failed, Griego
sued IRA Resources and Eldorado alleging that Martinez was their agent
and that they had engaged in an illegal sale of securities in Texas, which
defrauded investors.27 The trial court denied the California defendants'
objection to personal jurisdiction in spite of its finding that Martinez was
not their agent. The court of appeals affirmed, but the Texas Supreme
Court reversed, finding that neither IRA Resources nor Eldorado had
purposefully directed their activities at Texas. 28
In Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg,29 the Texas Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts' finding of specific jurisdiction over a Utah-
based river-rafting company for the death of a thirteen-year-old Texas
boy in Arizona. Moki Mac had not actively solicited business in Texas,
but had mailed the decedent's parents two brochures after the parents
learned of the company through a friend in Texas. The supreme court
found that specific jurisdiction required a substantial connection between
forum contacts and the facts of the litigation, which was missing here.30
In PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., the Texas Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts' finding of general jurisdiction for a
third-party claim against a Louisiana hospital by Kimberly-Clark Corpo-
ration in a toxic-tort wrongful death claim related to tampons. 31
In another jurisdiction case, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that
Texas lacked specific and general jurisdiction over a Bermudan ship man-
ager, a Canadian ship-management company, and an Indian crew man-
ager for a crew member's death in a traffic accident while ashore in Texas
to purchase supplies for the ship.32
26. 221 S.W.3d 592, 594 (Tex. 2007).
27. Id. at 595.
28. Id. at 596-99.
29. 221 S.W.3d 569, 573 (Tex. 2007).
30. Id. at 576-89. The opinion develops a detailed argument on the substantial connec-
tion requirement, including elements of "but-for relatedness;" "substantive relevance/prox-
imate cause;" "sliding scale relationship;" and "substantial connection to operative facts."
Id. at 579-85. Two dissenting justices argued that the majority's application of the related-
ness requirement was misplaced and that Moki Mac had, at best, a forum non conveniens
argument. Id. at 588-92 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
31. 235 S.W.3d 163, 171 (Tex. 2007).
32. See generally Farwah v. Prosperous Mar. Corp., 220 S.W.3d 585 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 2007, no pet.).
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D. FORUM NON CONVENIENS DISMISSALS
Forum non conveniens, or inconvenient forum, is an old common law
objection to jurisdiction that now is also available through some statutes,
such as 28 U.S.C. § 1404 for intra-jurisdictional transfers based on conve-
nience. 33 Because intra-federal transfers under § 1404 do not implicate
conflicts between states or nations, they are not considered here. This
article is limited to inter-jurisdictional forum non conveniens under the
common law, available in state and federal courts in Texas under the
same two-part test requiring the movant to show the availability of an
adequate alternative forum and that the balance of private and public
interests favors transfer. 34
In Dtex, L.L.C. v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., 35 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the federal district court's forum non
conveniens dismissal of an action in favor of litigation in Mexico. Plain-
tiff Dtex was a South Carolina company engaged in trading used textile
equipment. Dtex bought used textile equipment at a foreclosure sale in
Mexico "several years ago," and then became embroiled in a series of
lawsuits with Bancomer, a Mexican bank, who claimed a security interest
and superior right to the textiles. Dtex's efforts included a lawsuit in
South Carolina, which was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over
Bancomer. Dtex then sued Bancomer in Texas where it was subject to
personal jurisdiction because of a branch located in Houston. Bancomer
moved for forum non conveniens dismissal, which the federal district
court granted in April 2007. The Fifth Circuit upheld the dismissal,
adopting the district court's memorandum opinion and noting the "long,
dramatic, and sordid history of the parties' efforts," and that "even this
ongoing conflict's relatively small chapter in the Southern District of
Texas has produced a record on appeal comprising fourteen volumes, il-
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000) is the federal statutory provision for inconvenient forum
objections seeking transfer to another federal court. Texas law provides for in-state venue
transfers based on convenience under TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(b)
(Vernon 2002).
34. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 242 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gil-
bert, 330 U.S. 501, 507-08 (1947); McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 423-
24 (5th Cir. 2001). The private factors look to (1) the parties' convenience, including the
relative ease of access to sources of proof, the availability of compulsory process for the
attendance of unwilling witnesses, and the cost of obtaining their attendance; (2) the possi-
bility of viewing the premises, if appropriate; and (3) all other practical problems that
make the trial easy, expeditious and inexpensive. McLennan, 245 F.3d at 423. The public
factors look to (1) the courts concerns and the forum state's interests, including the admin-
istrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home; (3) the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a
forum familiar with the law that must govern the action; (4) the avoidance of unnecessary
conflict of laws problems; and (5) the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated fo-
rum with jury duty. Id. Texas forum non conveniens law is multi-faceted. TEX. CIv. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (Vernon 2008) applies to personal injury and wrongful death
claims. Common law forum non conveniens, in line with Gulf Oil, governs all other inter-
state and international forum convenience issues in Texas state courts. See In re Smith
Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1998).
35. 508 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2007).
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lustrative of the extent of this international brouhaha. '36
II. CHOICE OF LAW
Choosing the applicable substantive law is a question, like personal ju-
risdiction and judgment enforcement, involves both forum law and con-
stitutional issues. Understanding these issues requires a clear focus on
basic principles. First, choice of law is a question of state law, both in
state and federal courts.37 Second, it is a question of forum state law.
Renvoi-the practice of using another state's choice-of-law rule-is al-
most never employed unless the forum state directs it, and even then, the
forum state remains in control.38 Third, the forum state has broad power
to make choice-of-law decisions, either legislatively or judicially, subject
only to limited constitutional requirements. 39
Within the forum state's control of choice of law is a hierarchy of
choice-of-law rules. At the top are legislative choice-of-law rules, which
are statutes directing the application of certain state's laws based on
events or people important to the operation of that specific law. 40 Sec-
ond in the choice-of-law hierarchy is party-controlled choice of law,
which are choice-of-law clauses in contracts that control unless public
policy dictates otherwise. 41 Third in the hierarchy is the common law,
now controlled in Texas by the most significant relationship test of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 42 This Survey article is organ-
ized according to this hierarchy, that is, statutory choice of law, followed
by choice-of-law clauses, and concluding with choice of law under the
most significant relationship test. Special issues such as constitutional
36. Id. at 787. The district court's opinion, adopted in the Fifth Circuit's opinion, dis-
plays a textbook analysis of the Piper Aircraft forum non conveniens factors. Id. at 793-804
(citing Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 235).
37. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
38. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS creates a presumption
against renvoi except for limited circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1971). Although commentators defend renvoi's limited use, they ac-
knowledge its general lack of acceptance in the United States except in limited
circumstances, usually found in statutes directing the use of renvoi. See, e.g., SCOLES, supra
note 2, at 134-39; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 88-94. Texas law provides for renvoi in
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.105, 2.402(b), 4.102(b), 8.106, 9.103 (Vernon 1994 &
2002). For federal courts, Klaxon reiterates the forum state's control of choice of law. 313
U.S. at 497.
39. See infra notes 109-136 and accompanying text for a brief description of these
constitutional requirements.
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1), cmt. a (1971). See e.g.,
Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d 560, 573 (Tex. 1999) (applying an earlier version of
the Texas wrongful death statute, requiring that the court "apply the rules of substantive
law that are appropriate to the case" (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 71.031 (Vernon Supp. 2007), as amended in 1997, with the same wording as this
provision)).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 187 (1971) ("Law of the State
Chosen by the Parties") allows contracting parties to choose a governing law, within de-
fined limits as explained infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text. Texas has adopted this
section. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 679, 677-78 (Tex. 1990).
42. See infra note 66 for the factors in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 6 (1971).
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limitations are discussed in the following section. This grouping results in
a discussion that mixes Texas Supreme Court opinions with those of
Texas intermediate appellate courts, federal district courts, and the Fifth
Circuit. In spite of this mix, readers should note that because choice of
law is a state law issue, the only binding opinions are those of the Texas
Supreme Court. 43
A. STATUTORY CHOICE-OF-LAw RULES
The Survey period offered two significant cases involving choice-of-law
statutes. Citizens Insurance Co. of America v. Daccach,4 4 discussed below
at length, turned on a statutory application that was not necessarily a
choice-of-law statute. The case involved a thirty-five nation class action
for selling securities in other nations in violation of Texas law. The Texas
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs may, in some cases, specify the con-
trolling law and bypass routine choice-of-law analysis in a multinational
suit by bringing the claim under a specific forum statute that does not
dictate the controlling law, but merely proscribes certain behavior in
Texas.45 The case is more notable for its discussion of legislative jurisdic-
tion, that is, the due process limits on Texas applying its regulatory law to
events outside of Texas, even though the supreme court found that these
activities occurred in Texas. 46
In Hyde v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc.,4 7 the Fifth Circuit made an unu-
sual analysis of statutory choice-of-law rules in a claim against a pharma-
ceutical company for injuries from the drug Accutane. Hyde was a Texas
resident who sued Hoffman-La Roche in a Texas state court. Hoffman-
La Roche removed the case to federal court and then moved to dismiss
under Texas's statute of repose of fifteen years for product liability ac-
tions. 48 In response, Hyde filed an identical action in New Jersey state
court, where several similar claims were pending, and moved for volun-
tary dismissal of his Texas case. The federal district court granted that
dismissal, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds
that (1) the applicable Texas personal injury statute barred actions that
were not timely filed under Texas law; (2) this included the Texas statute
of repose in spite of its status as substantive law rather than a forum-
limitation rule; and (3) the dismissal deprived Hoffman-La Roche of the
opportunity to argue in New Jersey that the action was barred by Texas
43. The exception is when a federal court rules on a constitutional issue, such as legis-
lative jurisdiction or full faith and credit, or federal questions such as foreign sovereign
immunity. See e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 672-74 (Tex.
2004) (legislative jurisdiction). See also the cases discussed infra notes 109-36.
44. 217 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2007). The case is discussed infra in notes 112-28 and accom-
panying text.
45. Id. at 442-46.
46. Id. at 446-48.
47. 511 F.3d 506, 507, 511 (5th Cir. 2007).





In re Vartec Telecom, Inc. displays a more typical statutory choice-of-
law rule, though ultimately rejecting it. 0 In 2004, Vartec Telecom filed a
Chapter 11 bankruptcy action, which was then converted into a Chapter
7. The trustee then filed an adversary proceeding against certain officers
and directors, followed by Federal Insurance Company ("Federal") filing
a declaratory judgment action seeking to rescind the directors' and of-
ficers' insurance policy based on fraud during the application process.
The trustee, along with the directors and officers, moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, arguing that Federal had failed to give the re-
quired notice under Texas law. Federal countered that Mississippi law
governed because Vartec was a Mississippi entity and the policy was is-
sued in Mississippi.51
In choosing the applicable law, the court noted that it must first look to
the forum's statutory directives, in this case the Texas Insurance Code,
which provides that Texas law governs any insurance contract (1) with
proceeds payable to a Texas citizen or inhabitant, (2) issued by an insurer
doing business in Texas, and (3) issued in the course of the insurer's doing
business in Texas.52 The court found that Federal had issued the policy in
Mississippi in the course of doing business there and not in Texas; accord-
ingly, the statute did not apply.53 The court then selected Mississippi law
under a most significant relationship analysis.54
B. CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
Texas law and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws permit
contracting parties to choose a governing law,55 as reflected in four cases
during the Survey period. In Nexen, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Engineering
Co.,56 the Houston Court of Appeals for the First District used a DeSan-
tis analysis to conclude that the Alberta, Canada statute of repose ap-
plied. Canadianoxy Offshore International (COIL) contracted with Gulf
Interstate Engineering (GIE) to provide engineering services for a pro-
posed oil processing and development facility and pipeline in Yemen.
The contract contained an Alberta choice-of-law clause. In July or Au-
gust 1993, the pipeline became operational, but GIE still had a punch list
and "ROW clean-up" items to complete. In July 1994, GIE certified it
had completed all engineering services. In April 2002, flooding in Yemen
49. Id. at 511-14. See also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 2007: Twenty-First Annual Survey, 56 AM J. COMP. L. 243, 273-78 (2007), discuss-
ing this and other related claims against Hoffman-La Roche, including their choice-of-law
implications.
50. No. 07-03056, 2007 WL 2142499 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. July 23, 2007).
51. Id. at *4.
52. Id. at *2 (discussing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.42 (Vernon 1981)).
53. Id. at *4.
54. Id. at *4-5.
55. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
56. 224 S.W.3d 412, 419-23 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
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caused the pipeline to move and caused damages to the pipeline. 57
Nexen, COIL's corporate successor, sued GIE alleging breach of con-
tract, breach of warranty, negligence, and strict liability. GIE answered,
alleging the affirmative defense of the ten-year statute of repose under
Texas or Alberta law. GIE moved for summary judgment against all
claims, arguing that under both the Alberta and Texas statutes, the date
of completion of July 1993 applied as the accrual date for purposes of
repose. Nexen responded that Alberta and Texas law differed and, as the
clause stated, Alberta law governed. The trial court took judicial notice
of relevant law, and without specifying which law it applied, rendered a
take nothing summary judgment for GIE on all claims.58
Using a DeSantis analysis under section 187 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws, the First Houston Court of Appeals held that
the Alberta statute of repose applied. 59 Unlike many limitation statutes,
statutes of repose are considered substantive rather than procedural.
Section 187 requires courts to consider whether the application of the
parties' chosen law would be contrary to a fundamental Texas public pol-
icy. The court noted that the Texas repose statute applied to a more spec-
ified group of plaintiffs, while the Alberta statute was of general
application. Both repose statutes, however, had ten-year periods and
both had similar underlying policies and purposes. Finally, the court rec-
ognized that at least one other Texas court had applied another jurisdic-
tion's statute of repose. 60 The court concluded that the application of
Alberta's statute of repose did not offend any fundamental public policy
of Texas and affirmed the trial court's judgment. 61
Parker Barber & Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Wella Corp. was an unusual
case with bifurcated clauses-a choice-of-forum clause designating Vir-
ginia, and choice-of-law clause designating New York.62 The suit, involv-
ing both contract and tort claims, arose over Wella's termination of an
exclusive distribution agreement for hair care products. The trial court
refused to enforce the Virginia forum clause, and then noted that the
New York choice-of-law clause governed only the contract claims. The
parties did not dispute that Texas had the most significant relationship to
the tort claims. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed on all points, with
the interesting result of a dispute with a Virginia choice-of-forum clause
and a New York choice-of-law clause being litigated in Texas with Texas
law governing some of the claims.63
57. Id. at 415.
58. Id. at 417.
59. Id. at 419-20.
60. Id. at 422 (citing Crisman v. Cooper, 748 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ
denied)).
61. Id. at 422.
62. No. 03-04-00623-CV, 2006 WL 2918571, at *1, 11 (Tex. App.-Austin Oct. 11,
2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).
63. Id. at *5-11.
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In two other Survey-period cases, one Texas district court upheld a Cal-
ifornia choice-of-law clause in a store's indemnity claim against a manu-
facturer for a customer injured by a collapsing chair,64 and another Texas
district court upheld a Texas choice-of-law clause for claims and counter-
claims between a Texas-based company and a Tennessee-based cabinet
supplier.65
C. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST
In the absence of a statutory choice-of-law rule or an effective choice-
of-law clause, Texas courts apply the most significant relationship test as
stated in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 66 The award for
the most adept handling of the greatest number of choice-of-law issues
goes to the Southern District of Texas in Deep Marine Technology, Inc. v.
Conmaco/Rector, L.P.67 Plaintiff Deep Marine was a Texas company en-
gaged in offshore diving operations. It leased a winch, which was reputed
to operate up to a depth of ten thousand feet, from Louisiana-based Con-
maco. When the winch failed and resulted in business losses, Deep
Marine sued in a state court in Houston alleging breach of contract, negli-
gent misrepresentation, and fraud. Conmaco removed to federal court,
where Deep Marine moved for partial summary judgment on the ground
that Texas law governed rather than Louisiana law. The parties' contract
had no choice-of-law clause, so the analysis of all three claims occurred
under the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 68
The court carefully but efficiently analyzed the choice-of-law issues, be-
ginning with the need to find a material conflict between Texas and Loui-
siana law on each claim. For the contract claim, Texas law allowed
attorney fees for the prevailing party, while Louisiana law allowed fees
only if provided by contract. Applying section 187 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, the court found that Louisiana law gov-
erned because of the location of the winch, the place of negotiation, and
the place of performance and alleged failure.69 For the negligent misrep-
64. Hegwood v. Ross Stores, Inc., No. 3:04:CV-2674-BH(G), 2007 WL 2187245, at *6
(N.D. Tex. July 28, 2007) (upholding California choice-of-law clause for an initially tort-
based claim because the indemnity agreement was contractual).
65. B.J. Tidwell Indus., Inc. v. Diversified Home Prods., Inc., No. SA-06-CA-0264 FB
(NN), 2007 WL 3377184, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 11, 2007) (mem. op.).
66. The embodiment of the most significant relationship test are seven factors to be
balanced according to the needs of the particular case: (a) the needs of the interstate and
international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of
other interested states, and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underly-
ing the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g)
ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971). This listing is not by priority, which varies from
case to case. Id. at cmt. c. In a larger sense, the most significant relationship test includes
the other choice-of-law sections found throughout the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws.
67. 515 F. Supp. 2d 760 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
68. Id. at 770-72.
69. Id. at 770-71.
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resentation claim, the court found no meaningful difference between the
two states' laws and accordingly applied Texas law.70 The fraud claim was
also governed by Texas law under the analysis in section 148 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which applies specifically to
fraud. Here, the district court found that even though the contract was
centered in Louisiana, the alleged fraud occurred during meetings in
Houston.71 In bifurcating the choice-of-law results, the district court also
correctly noted that Texas choice-of-law rules require an issue-by-issue
analysis, which may result in the application of different states' laws to
the same dispute.72
1. Contract Cases
In re AutoNation, Inc. is discussed above in the Forum Contest section
but has significant choice-of-law implications. 73 It involved a non-com-
pete agreement between Florida-based AutoNation and a Texas em-
ployee who went to work for a competitor. The non-judicial facts are
identical to those in DeSantis, where the Texas Supreme Court held that a
Florida company's non-compete agreement with a Texas employee was
unenforceable in Texas, and that the parties' choice of Florida law had to
yield to Texas public policy interests.74 The difference in AutoNation was
the contract's exclusive Florida forum clause. The Texas Supreme Court
held that nothing in Texas law dictates that all Texas employment dis-
putes be litigated in Texas.75 In DeSantis, the Florida employer sought
enforcement in Texas. The supreme court thus dismissed the Texas em-
ployee's local lawsuit in favor of AutoNation's first-filed suit in Florida.76
Jose Diaz de Leon v. Tesco Corp. was a parallel case of wrongful dis-
charge with an interesting holding that no choice-of-law analysis is re-
quired where the plaintiff merely seeks a declaratory judgment under
Texas law. 77 Tesco, a Canadian corporation with subsidiaries in the
United States and Mexico, hired de Leon in 1996 as a financial and con-
tract administrator for its United States territory. When Tesco termi-
nated his position five years later, de Leon sued in Mexico, asserting
claims relating to profit sharing, overtime pay, unjustified termination,
back salary, and other benefits de Leon claimed under Mexican law.
Tesco responded by seeking a declaratory judgment from a Texas court,
alleging that de Leon's suit in Mexico had breached his severance agree-
ment with Tesco. The Texas trial court granted Tesco's partial summary
70. Id. at 771.
71. Id. at 771-72.
72. Id. at 769 (citing Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Emerency Servs. Inc., 175 S.W.3d 284,
291 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
73. 228 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. 2007). The case is discussed supra at notes 3-11 and accom-
panying text.
74. See generally Desantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990).
75. 228 S.W.3d at 669.
76. Id. at 670; see also Symeonides, supra note 49, at 273-78
77. No. 14-04-00513-CV, 2006 WL 3313357, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
Nov. 16, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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judgment on the issue that the severance agreement barred the suit in
Mexico, but the court declined to rule on whether de Leon had breached
the agreement.78
De Leon appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in applying Texas
law rather than Mexican law because most of his employment either oc-
curred in Mexico or benefitted the Mexican subsidiary. In the Mexican
lawsuit, de Leon sought relief under Mexican law, which negated the sev-
erance agreement. De Leon argued that he was not seeking relief under
Texas law, thereby making the Texas suit inappropriate. The Houston
Fourteenth District Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the trial
court did not determine what law would apply but merely made the dec-
laration that to the extent Texas law applies, de Leon's claims would be
barred by the legal effect of the release, including all claims asserted
within the Mexican lawsuit. 79 The court further found that no law on
record precluded a Texas court from issuing a declaratory judgment while
a lawsuit is pending in a foreign jurisdiction. 80
In other cases, Dallas federal courts used section 188 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws to (1) choose Texas over French law in a
lawsuit over a distributorship agreement to be performed in France;81 (2)
confirm the parties' concession that Tennessee law governed an insurer's
disputed duty to defend Home Depot in a related action, with the confir-
mation diminishing that issue on any appeal;82 and (3) apply Mississippi
law to a claim for rescinding a directors and officers insurance policy in a
bankruptcy case.83
2. Tort Cases
Emke v. Compana, L.L.C.,84 a case involving a conversion claim re-
garding a domain name, is an interesting example of choice of law con-
trolling whether a plaintiff has stated a claim. It also highlights Texas
law's odd exclusion of intangible property from conversion claims. Emke
and Compana disputed ownership of the domain name "servers.com."
Emke claimed he bought it in August 2000 and never expressed desire to
abandon it, but it was placed in a deletion queue accidentally by a third-
party, Network Solutions. Compana found the domain in the deletion
queue and paid for it to be moved. Emke sued Texas-based Compana in
a Nevada federal court, alleging conversion of personal property and
cybersquatting and seeking return of the domain name without compen-
78. Id. at *1.
79. Id. at *2.
80. Id.
81. See AMX Corp. v. Pilote Films, No. 3:04-VCV-2035-D, 2007 WL 1695120, at *12-
14 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2007). The case is discussed infra at notes 147-50 and accompanying
text.
82. See Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3:06-CV-24-L, 2007 WL
2089390, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 20, 2007).
83. In re Vartec Telecom, No. 04-81694, 2007 WL 2142499, at *4-5 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
July 23, 2007). The case is discussed supra at notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
84. No. 3:06-SV-1416-L, 2007 WL 2781661, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2007).
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sation. Compana filed a motion to dismiss or alternatively, to transfer
venue to the Northern District of Texas, where two other cases involving
the parties were underway. 85
The Nevada federal court transferred the case. Compana then moved
for judgment on the pleadings, and Emke moved for summary judgment,
or another venue transfer to Nevada or California. In spite of the myriad
of procedural motions in the three cases, the focal issue became which
law governed. Emke's claim was for conversion. Under Texas law, con-
version applies only to physical property, whereas California law includes
intangibles like domain names. 86
The court first had to decide the basis for the venue transfer from Ne-
vada. If Nevada was an improper venue, then Texas choice-of-law rules
would govern. If the transfer was merely for convenience, then the origi-
nal venue would control and Nevada choice-of-law rules would apply. 87
The transfer order only cited the legal standard for convenience, and the
Texas federal court thus applied Nevada choice-of-law rules. Nevada
uses the most-significant-relationship test-the same as Texas-and Cali-
fornia prevailed as the situs of injury, the situs of domain registration, and
the place of Emke's residence. 88 The court then concluded that Emke
had sufficiently plead the elements for a conversion claim and denied the
motion to dismiss.89
Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Murat Holdings involved a claim of tortious in-
terference flowing from a franchise agreement between Red Roof Inns,
based in Ohio, and Murat, a Louisiana L.L.C. with its principle place of
business in Florida.90 Murat entered a franchise agreement with Red
Roof for a hotel in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The hotel needed renova-
tions, and Red Roof initially approved the work done by Murat. But
prior to the hotel's opening, Red Roof was acquired by Accor, which
then disapproved of the renovations and blocked the hotel's scheduled
opening. Accor also owned Motel 6. Murat sued in a Texas state court in
Dallas asserting contract, statutory, and tort claims. 91 The trial court
granted summary judgment to Red Roof on all but the contract claims,
which resulted in a $5.8 million jury verdict for Murat. The parties ap-
85. Id. The first Texas action, a 2003 federal lawsuit filed by Compana, was dismissed
without prejudice. Id. The second Texas action was a 2004 suit filed in Texas state court by
Compana for declaratory judgment, slander of title, and tortious interference with prospec-
tive business relations. Id. Emke removed the second case to federal court in Dallas, but
on Compana's motion, it was remanded to state court. Id.
86. Id. at *3.
87. Id. at *34. Venue transfers based on convenience under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) re-
quire that the transferee court apply the choice-of-law rule from the state where the trans-
feror court is located. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1990). This rule
does not apply to venue transfers under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 for wrong venue, in which case
the transferee court applies the local state's choice-of-law rules. See Lafferty v. St. Riel,
495 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2007); see also WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 669 n.121.
88. Emke, 2007 WL 2781661, at *4-5.
89. Id. at *9.




pealed. The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict on the
contract claims based on an erroneous jury instruction, but also reversed
the summary judgment against Murat on the tort claims. Rejecting the
trial court's application of Ohio law to the tort claims, the court of ap-
peals held that the franchise agreement's choice-of-law provision applied
only to contract claims, and that under section 145 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws, Louisiana law governed.92 The case was
remanded for a new trial on all claims.93
In Jelec USA, Inc. v. Safety Controls, Inc.,94 the court demonstrated
how to use the various sections of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws to reach a decision in close calls. This was an employer's action
against a competitor and a former employee for misappropriation of con-
fidential information. Both employers were oilfield service companies lo-
cated in Lafayette, Louisiana. The employee, Pope, lived in Caenco,
Louisiana, near Lafayette. Pope marketed Jelec's products to oil compa-
nies in Louisiana and Texas. While employed at Jelec, Pope developed a
database that he later took with him to a new job with Safety Controls,
who soon won a Diamond Offshore contract, for which Jelec had previ-
ously bid. Some of Pope's contacts with Diamond occurred in Texas.
Jelec sued Pope and Safety Controls in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas. 95
Plaintiff Jelec argued that Louisiana and Texas laws were identical on
the material points in this case. Defendants argued, and the court found,
that Louisiana law had a stricter requirement for maintaining trade
secrets. After a detailed analysis of the relevant choice-of-law facts under
section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, the court
slightly favored Texas law.96 Seeking further analysis, the court examined
both section 145, the general tort principle, and section 156, the rule fo-
cusing on tortious conduct, which creates a presumption that the gov-
erning law is the place of conduct. Again using a detailed analysis leading
to a close finish, the court concluded that this dispute between three Lou-
isiana parties, regarding employment based in Louisiana, was to be gov-
erned by Texas law.97
In Warfield v. Carnie, a the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Texas used a straightforward application of section 145 of
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws to choose Washington state
law for claims of fraudulent transfer of receivership assets following fed-
eral prosecution for securities fraud based on Washington being the situs
of the assets, the affected companies, and the conduct, even though the
affected investors resided in at least thirty-four states.98 In Harrison v.
92. Id. at 685.
93. Id. at 690.
94. 498 F. Supp. 2d 945 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
95. Id. at 946-47.
96. Id. at 947-51.
97. Id. at 951-52.
98. No. 3:04-CV-633-R, 2007 WL 1112591, at *7-8 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2007).
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Procter & Gamble Co.,99 the same federal court-Judge Buchmeyer pre-
siding-again used section 145 to apply Texas law to tortious interference
claims arising from Proctor & Gamble's acquisition of Gillette. In doing
so, the court rejected Proctor & Gamble's argument for enforcing a
choice-of-law clause designating Delaware law because the claims
sounded in tort rather than contract and the defendant argued precedent
related to choice-of-forum clauses rather than choice-of-law clauses. 100
In Perforaciones Maritimas Mexicanas, S.A. de C.V. v. Grupo TMM, S.A.
de C. V.,1 °1 a federal court used a federal choice-of-law rule-the Laurit-
zen-Rhoditis test-to apply Mexican law to a collision between a ship and
an oil rig in the Bay of Campeche, Mexico.
3. Class Action Certifications
Class actions certified under the common-question-predominates stan-
dard of Texas and federal law require a showing that a common question
of law or fact predominates over disparate issues in the case. 10 2 In Citi-
zens Insurance Co. of America v. Daccach, the Texas Supreme Court held
that in cases where plaintiffs allege claims solely under a Texas statute
that directs its application to that activity and that statute's regulation of
extraterritorial activity is sound, the choice-of-law analysis under Com-
paq is unnecessary. 10 3
4. Corporate Governance
National Architectural Products Co. v. Atlas-Telecom Services-USA,
Inc. involved a dispute arising from the purchase of corporate assets.' 0 4
Plaintiff National Architectural Products purchased convertible deben-
tures in Millenium Armor, a Texas corporation, which it alleges disposed
of the assets through an alter ego, JTA, in a series of transactions. Plain-
tiff sued under several theories, including securities fraud, fraudulent
transfer, fraudulent concealment, conspiracy to defraud, unjust enrich-
ment, breach of contract, and common law fraud. In addition to a num-
ber of motions to dismiss on other grounds, the court considered the
99. No. 7:06-CV-121-R, 2007 WL 431085 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 8, 2007).
100. Id. at *4-5.
101. No. G-05-419, 2007 WL 1428654, at *3-5 (S.D. Tex. May 10, 2007). The Lauritzen-
Rhoditis test comes from two cases-Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), and Hel-
lenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 (1970)-and applies eight factors: (1) the place of
the wrongful act; (2) the law of the flag; (3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured party;
(4) the allegiance of the defendant ship owner; (5) the place of the contract; (6) the inac-
cessibility of the forum; (7) the law of the forum; and (8) the shipowner's base of opera-
tions. See id.
102. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(3). See also Compaq Com-
puter Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 680-81 (Tex. 2004) where the Texas Supreme Court
clarified the need for an appropriate choice-of-law analysis in certifying multi-state class
actions. Lapray is discussed at James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 58
SMU L. REv. 679, 706-07 (2005).
103. 217 S.W.3d 430, 440-43 (Tex. 2007). The case is discussed infra notes 112-28. See
also Compaq, 135 S.W.3d at 680-81.
104. No. 3:06-CV-0751-G, 2007 WL 2051125, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 13, 2007).
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defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.10 5 In determin-
ing which law governed the state law claims, the court rejected the con-
tract and tort theories and held that the operative theory was corporate
governance because a primary issue was successor liability.106 The court
noted that Texas had never expressly adopted section 302 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which focuses on corporate govern-
ance, but chose to follow it in this case. Section 302 calls for the
application of the law of the state of incorporation to corporate govern-
ance questions unless another state has a more significant relationship.'0
7
Examining the facts, the court concluded that North Carolina law gov-
erned as the state of JTA's incorporation, rather than the law of Dela-
ware or Virginia.108
D. OTHER CHOICE-OF-LAW ISSUES
1. Legislative Jurisdiction and Other Constitutional Limits on State
Choice-of-Law Rules
Similar to the due-process limitation on state long-arm statutes, 10 9 the
United States Constitution imposes limits on a state's ability to choose
the governing law in its courts. Unlike the limits on state long-arm stat-
utes (which arise only under the due-process clause), the choice-of-law
limits arise under several doctrines-due process (requiring a reasonable
connection between the dispute and the governing law), full faith and
credit (requiring the choice-of-law analysis to consider the interests of
other affected states), and to a lesser extent, equal protection, privileges
and immunities, the commerce clause, and the contract clause. 110 Consti-
tutional problems most often occur when a state court chooses its own
law in questionable circumstances. But the inappropriate choice-of-fo-
rum law is not the only conceivable constitutional issue, and even when
choosing foreign law, courts must apply choice-of-law rules with an eye
toward constitutional limitations.111
Two cases raised during the Survey period issues of legislative jurisdic-
tion. Citizens Insurance Co. of America v. Daccach,"2 this year's most
interesting case, involved several choice-of-law questions, including the
role of choice-of-law analysis in a world-wide class action, the state's
105. Id.
106. Id. at *10-11.
107. Id. at *11 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2)(1971)).
108. Id. at *10-13.
109. See e.g., IRA Res., Inc. v. Griego, 221 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Tex. 2007).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9; see also SCOLES, supra
note 2, at 145-76; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 585-648; James P. George, Choice of Law:
A Guide for Texas Attorneys, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 833, 844-46 (1994). Choice-of-law
limits under full faith and credit are now questionable after Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v.
Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 499 (2003).
111. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 680 (Tex. 2004), discussed
at George & Teller, supra note 102, at 706-07.
112. 217 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2007).
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power to regulate extraterritorial commercial activity, and the role of
statutorily-designated choice of law as opposed to that under the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Defendant Citizens and its subsidiary
CICA were Colorado corporations with their primary offices in Austin,
Texas. Their business was limited to selling life insurance policies to peo-
ple outside the United States with purchasers in over thirty-five countries,
including the United States (with the U.S.-based purchasers presumably
buying policies to cover non-U.S. insureds). These policies allowed the
policyholders-not necessarily the insureds-to assign dividends and
other benefits to offshore trusts. In each year since 1996, there have been
approximately 30,000 CICA policies in effect, with each policyholder pay-
ing average dividends of $2,000 and at least seventy-five percent assigning
dividends and benefits to offshore trusts." 13
In August 1999, two Colombian citizens brought a class action in a
Texas state court alleging
(1) violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, (2) breach
of contract, (3) fraud, (4) fraud in the inducement (5) negligent mis-
representation, (6) breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,(7) violations of the Texas Insurance Code, (8) equitable reformation
of the policies, (9) conspiracy to plan and implement this scheme,
and (10) unjust enrichment and the imposition of a constructive
trust.' 14
Four months later, an amended petition added seven named plaintiffs
along with a claim for selling securities in violation of Texas law. 115
The Texas Securities Act requires that securities dealers register in
Texas, 116 and it provides a private cause of action against violators.11 7
Citizens and CICA were not registered in Texas or anywhere else in the
United States, nor were they registered in any jurisdiction where the in-
sureds purchased the policies. The common stock purchased with the
policy premiums from Citizens are listed on the American Stock
Exchange. 118
In June 2001, one of the added plaintiffs, Dr. Fernando Hakim Dac-
cach, filed his own motion for class certification, naming himself as the
only class representative and seeking only one claim for class certifica-
tion-failing to register with the Texas Securities Board. He expressly
disclaimed any plan to pursue the other ten causes of action, but the re-
maining named plaintiffs filed an amended petition maintaining those ten
claims individually, not as class representatives. 1 9
113. Id. at 435.
114. Id. at 435-36.
115. Id. at 436.
116. "No person, firm, corporation or dealer shall, directly or through agents, offer for
sale, sell or make a sale of any securities in this state without first being registered as in this
Act provided." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581, § 12(A) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
117. Id. at 33(A).
118. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d at 435.
119. Id. at 436.
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The defendants objected to class certification, arguing that Texas law
should not apply to this multi-national class action. Daccach responded
with a choice-of-law analysis pointing to Texas law without analyzing the
laws of any other jurisdictions. After a four-day hearing, the trial court
certified Daccach's class of persons who, during the class period, "(1) pur-
chased a CICA policy and executed an assignment to a trust for the
purchase of Citizens, Inc. stock, or (2) paid any money that, pursuant to a
CICA policy and assignment to a trust, was for the purchase of Citizens,
Inc. stock, or (3) were entitled to any cash benefits from a CICA policy
that were for the purchase of Citizens, Inc. stock.' 120 On interlocutory
appeal, defendants challenged the class definition, the applicability of
Texas law to these claims, and the correct determination of class prereq-
uisites. The Austin Court of Appeals upheld the class certification with a
one-word change to the class definition.
121
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded on a point that does
not concern this article's choice-of-law discussion-specifically that the
trial court had failed to consider the preclusion possibilities of claims that
are un-alleged, abandoned, or severed from the class action.122 This hold-
ing was remarkable for its clarification of class action preclusion holding,
but equally notable is the supreme court's choice-of-law holding that
Texas law applies to a thirty-five nation class action.
123
This conclusion involved two crucial analyses. First, the supreme court
considered whether plaintiffs (in a class or otherwise) pursue a claim
under a Texas statute that purports to regulate multinational transactions
and thereby control the choice of law. Significantly, plaintiffs have no
such option when suing under common law rights in a multi-state or
multi-national setting. In addition the plaintiffs asserted a specific statu-
tory claim that defendants sold securities internationally, and did so with-
out complying with Texas law. The supreme court held that this statutory
claim did not invoke a "traditional" choice-of-law analysis. 124 The su-
preme court pointed out that while Texas uses the most significant rela-
tionship test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, that test is
qualified by a provision giving priority to legislative directives for choice
of law. 125 The supreme court further found that the Texas antitrust law
directed the application of Texas law to securities sold in Texas. 126 As a
result, the supreme court held that the most significant relationship test is
inapplicable to cases controlled by a statutory choice of law.
12 7
120. Id. at 436-37.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 448-58.
123. Id. at 439-48.
124. Id. at 445.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 446.
127. Id. at 442-43. This holding seemingly diminished, and according to the supreme
court abrogated, the recent holding in Compaq Computer Corp. v. LaPray, 135 S.W.3d 657
(Tex. 2004), that class certifications require a thorough choice-of-law analysis to determine
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The second issue addressed was legislative jurisdiction: apart from any
legislative intent, whether Texas securities laws can regulate activities in
other countries. Noting the constitutional limits on a state applying its
law extraterritorially, the supreme court found that because all the poli-
cies were generated from Texas, a major portion of the marketing and
sales activities were initiated in Texas, and Citizen's offices were in Texas,
the constitutional bar did not apply. 128
Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co. was the second legislative juris-
diction case. 129 It was decided in October 2006, and it was reported cur-
sorily in the 2006 Survey. Now fully released, it is worthy of a full report
here. Harmar and other soft drink bottlers sued Coca-Cola over "calen-
dar marketing agreements," or CMAs, alleging violations of Texas anti-
trust laws and the laws of three other states: Louisiana, Arkansas, and
Oklahoma. 130 The suit was brought in Texas because the CMAs specified
Texas as the venue in the contracts with the retailers. The jury found that
Coca-Cola engaged in conduct in violation of the Texas Free Enterprise
and Antitrust Act ("TFEAA") and awarded damages. These damages
did not distinguish between the damages as pertaining to each of the four
states. The court further enjoined Coca-Cola from carrying out the
CMAs in the region for a period of seven years. 13 1 The Texarkana Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision, rejected Coca-Cola's argument that the
lower court should not have awarded jury fees, and enjoined Coca-Cola
from participating in the CMAs for conduct occurring outside of Texas. 132
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, finding no antitrust violation on
the merits but also discussed several difficult choice-of-law issues. 1 33 One
question was whether the Texas antitrust laws could cover markets in
other states, and if not, should those states' laws be applied. The supreme
court answered that Texas antitrust laws could not apply in other states,
and that Texas could not enforce the antitrust laws of other states.134 A
whether the class members claims will be governed by sufficiently-similar legal standards.
See Daccach, 217 S.W.3d at 440-41.
128. Id. at 477 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19 (1985);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
129. 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006).
130. Id. at 674. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust
Act of 1983, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.26 (Vernon 2002) [hereinafter
"TFEAA"]. CMAs are agreements between the manufacturer and the retailer to promote
the sale of a particular product through shelf placement, price discounts, feature specific
products, and otherwise elevate the marketing of the product over that of competing retail-
ers. They are common in the carbonated beverage distribution industry and have fre-
quently withstood antitrust challenges. The complaint here was that because Coca-Cola
has such strong market domination within the stated region, the CMAs effectively oper-
ated as a restraint on trade and suppressed competition from other bottlers. See Harman,
218 S.W.3d at 674-76.
131. Harman, 281 S.W.3d at 678-79.
132. Id. at 679.
133. Id. at 680-82, 690.
134. Id. at 680-82. The supreme court found no legislative intent to regulate conduct
outside of Texas or provide remedies for plaintiffs outside of Texas. Id. The supreme courtfurther found that even if the Texas legislature had intended extraterritorial reach, that
such action in this case would likely violate principles of federalism. Id. at 681-82.
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strong four-justice dissent argued that because those other states' laws
were identical to Texas law, at least as far as the record indicated, Texas
courts had authority to address the entire claim.135 The dissent also dis-
agreed with the majority's ruling on the merits.136
2. False Conflicts
A false conflict exists when other potentially applicable laws are the
same as the forum's, or at least reach the same result.1 37 Defining a clear,
outcome-changing difference between the forum's law and the foreign
law is the first step in conducting a choice-of-law analysis, and the ab-
sence of a clear conflict should result in the application of forum law.138
The fact that the laws do not conflict may compel a conclusion that the
cases are not worth reporting, but that is a hasty conclusion in some cases.
Why the court determined the conflict to be false, the setting in which the
laws appeared identical, and the necessary degree of similarity are all is-
sues that may prove valuable to readers contemplating a choice-of-law
argument. Moreover, while some false-conflicts analyses may be cursory,
some are complex. 139
The Survey period produced four false-conflict cases. Allice Trading,
Inc. v. Shaw Environmental, Inc., was a suit for non-payment on the in-
stallation of storm sewers.' 40 Under a commission by the Harris County
Flood Control District, Allice Trading hired Shaw Environmental to in-
stall storm sewers at the Hills at Sims Greenway. Shaw was a Louisiana
corporation, and the contract provided a choice-of-law clause designating
Louisiana law as the governing law. After completing the work, Shaw
sued in federal court in Houston for non-payment. The court examined
the applicable legal principles regarding breach of contract under both
Texas and Louisiana law, found no conflict, and accordingly applied
Texas law.' 41 The court noted that had a conflict existed, the court would
have applied section 35.52 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code,
which provides a statutory directive for invalidation of a choice-of-law
clause when a construction contract is related to real property.
142
135. Id. at 694-99 (Brister, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 699-704 (Brister, J., dissenting).
137. This is the Restatement's definition of false conflict. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145, cmt. 1 (1971); id. at § 186, cmt. c. A very different concept of
false conflicts came from Professor Brainerd Currie's government interest analysis, which
defines a false conflict as one in which only one state has a real interest. See SCOLES, supra
note 2, at 29-30. Unfortunately, Texas courts have used both definitions. See James P.
George, False Conflicts and Faulty Analysis: Judicial Misuse of Governmental Interests in
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 23 REV. LITIG. 489, 493-95 (2004).
138. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 823-24 (1985) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
139. In the 2004 Survey period, a case involving arguments for the application of five
states' laws ended up with a false conflict. See In re Senior Living Props. L.L.C., 309 B.R.
223, 233 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004). The case is reported at George & Teller, supra note 102,
at 1069.
140. No. H-06-217, 2007 WL 2873375, at *1-2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2007).
141. Id. at *5-6.
142. Id. at *6 n.4.
[Vol. 61
Conflict of Laws
In AutonationDirect.com v. Civic Center Motors,143 the Fourteenth Dis-
trict Houston Court of Appeals avoided ruling on the parties' contractual
choice of New York law for the quasi-contract claim because the parties
agreed that New York and Texas law applied the same rule regarding the
availability of quasi-contract remedies. The general rule for false con-
flicts is that forum law applies, but here the court of appeals analyzed the
remaining issues under New York precedent. 144
In other cases, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismis-
sal of a pro se mental anguish claim regarding a restaurant's jukebox
playing the song "Redneck Mother," noting that the claim failed under
both Texas and Kansas law. 145 In addition, the Fifth Circuit found no
difference between Texas and Louisiana law on negligent misrepresenta-
tion in a diving company's claim for a failed deep sea winch.146
3. Renvoi
In AMX Corp. v. Pilote Films,147 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas demonstrated an appropriate use of
renvoi, not as a single rule but as one factor in a balancing test. Renvoi is
a choice-of-law device calling for the forum state to apply not just the
substantive law of another state or country, but also the choice-of-law
rule of that state or country. Carried to an extreme, renvoi can then call
for an examination of choice-of-law rules of third and fourth countries. It
has been little used in the United States but has not died out entirely.148
In AMX, the court chose Texas law over French law in a lawsuit over a
distributorship agreement to be performed in France. AMX, a Texas
company that designs, develops, and markets hardware and software
products for integrated control systems, agreed that Pilote could be its
exclusive distributor in France. The agreement began in 1994 and called
for an initial term of one year unless extended in writing. The parties
never executed the written extensions but continued the relationship for
ten years. In 2004, AMX notified Pilote that it intended to end the dis-
tributorship agreement, and Pilote responded that because of the value
Pilote had added to AMX's marketing in France, it could not end the
agreement without compensation. 149
AMX filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court in Dallas to
end the agreement. Both parties filed summary judgment motions, de-
bating the application of Texas law (AMX) or French law (Pilote). In
143. No. 14-06000193-CV, 2006 WL 3511808 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 7,
2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).
144. Id. at *24.
145. See Brackens v. Tex. Roadhouse in Wichita, 216 F. App'x 408, 410 (5th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam).
146. See Deep Marine Tech., Inc. v. Conmarco/Rector, L.P., 515 F. Supp. 2d 760, 769-71
(S.D. Tex. 2007).
147. No. 3:04-VCV-2035-D, 2007 WL 1695120, at *12-14 (N.D. Tex. June 5, 2007).
148. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 37-38, 91-94; SCOLES, supra note 2, at 134-39.
149. AMX, 2007 WL 1695120, at *1-2.
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applying sections 6 and 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws-and specifically section 6(2)(c)-the court considered the respec-
tive governmental interests of Texas and France. To ascertain France's
interest, the court considered which law a French court would apply. The
answer was that in litigating distributorship agreements, French law ap-
plies the law of the manufacturer's residence, thus pointing to Texas law
and more on point, minimizing France's interests.
150
4. Notice and Proof of Foreign Law
Litigants seeking the application of another state's or nation's law must
comply with the forum's rules for pleading and proving foreign law. In
both Texas and federal courts, judicial notice is sufficient for the applica-
tion of sister-states' laws.15' Foreign country law, on the other hand,
must be adequately pleaded and proven.152
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Gunderson, Inc. 153 con-
cerns a railroad derailment in Nebraska. In 1988, Burlington ("BNSF")
bought boxcars from Gunderson, located in Oregon where the cars were
designed and built. Gunderson had purchased a component, the draft-
key retainer system, from ASF-Keystone, a Delaware corporation with
general offices in Illinois and an end-of-car parts factory in Pennsylvania.
In 2000, a BNSF line derailed in Nebraska, causing a chemical spill, ex-
tensive damage to property, environmental clean-up, personal injuries,
and business interruption liabilities. BNSF's investigation concluded that
the derailment was caused by a failure in the parts furnished by Keystone
and sold to BNSF by Gunderson. 154
BNSF sued Gunderson and Keystone in Texas for negligence, product
liability, breach of warranty, contribution, equitable indemnity, and un-
150. Id. at *13.
151. TEX. R. EVID. 202 allows a Texas court to take judicial notice of sister states' laws
on its own motion and requires it to do so upon a party's motion. Parties must supply
"sufficient information" for the court to comply. Id. Federal practice is the same under
federal common law; neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure address judicial notice of American states' laws. See Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S.
218, 223 (1885); Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987). Even
though FED. R. EvID. 201 (the sole federal evidence rule dealing with judicial notice) does
not apply to states' laws, we should assume that Lamar's judicial notice mandate for Amer-
ican states' laws is subject to FED. R. EvID. 201(b)'s provision for proof of matters "capa-
ble of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EvID. 201. That is, federal courts may take judicial
notice of American states' laws from (1) official statutory and case reports, (2) widely-
used unofficial versions, or (3) copies, all subject to evidentiary rules on authentication and
best evidence.
152. TEX. R. EVID. 203 requires written notice of foreign law by pleading or other rea-
sonable notice at least thirty days before trial, including all written materials or sources
offered as proof. For non-English originals, parties must provide copies of both the origi-
nal and the English translation. Id. Sources include affidavits, testimony, briefs, treatises,
and any other material source, whether or not submitted by a party, and whether or not
otherwise admissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence. Id. Federal practice is similar.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.




just enrichment. Both Gunderson and Keystone filed summary judgment
motions, arguing that BNSF's claims were barred by the Texas statute of
repose because of the twelve-year span between purchase and alleged
failure. BNSF responded that it had too little time to conduct discovery
on which state's law would govern its claims, but in any event, it was not
Texas law. Crucially, BNSF never filed a Rule 202 motion asking the
court to take judicial notice of any other state's law. 155 The Fort Worth
Court of Appeals affirmed. 156
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments from other states and countries create Texas con-
flict-of-laws issues in two ways: (1) their local enforcement, and (2) their
preclusive effect on local lawsuits. Foreign judgments include those from
sister states and from foreign countries, but do not include federal courtjudgments from districts outside Texas because those judgments are en-
forced as local federal court judgments. 157
Texas recognizes two methods of enforcing foreign judgments: the
common law method using the foreign judgment as the basis for a local
lawsuit,158 and since 1981, the more direct procedure under the two
uniform judgments acts, 159 along with similar acts for arbitration
155. Id. at 290 (citing Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 695 (Tex
2006)).
156. Id. at 292.
157. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2000).
158. The underlying mandate for the common-law enforcement is the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, and its statutory
counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act ("UEFJA") specifically reserves the common-law method as an alternative. See TEX.
CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 2008).
159. Sister-state judgments are enforced under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act, TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 35.001-.007 (Vernon 2008). The
UEFJA requires (1) the judgment creditor to file a copy of the judgment authenticated
under federal or Texas law, id. § 35.003; (2) notice to the judgment debtor from the clerk,
id. § 35.004, or the judgment creditor, id. § 35.005. The judgment debtor may (1) move to
stay enforcement if grounds exist under the law of Texas or the rendering state, id.
§ 35.006, and (2) challenge enforcement along traditional full faith and credit grounds such
as the rendering state's lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction." Id. § 35.003.
Foreign-country judgments for money are enforced under the Uniform Foreign Country
Money-Judgment Recognition Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001-.008
(Vernon 2008) [hereinafter UFCMJRA]. Like the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA requires the
judgment creditor to file a copy of the foreign country judgment that has been authenti-
cated under federal or Texas law, id. § 36.0041, with notice to the debtor provided either by
the clerk, id. § 36.0042, or the creditor, id. § 36.0043. The judgment debtor has thirty days
to challenge enforcement, or sixty if he is domiciled in a foreign country, with a twenty-day
extension available for good cause. Id. § 36.0044. Unlike the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA
explicitly states ten grounds for non-recognition-three mandatory and seven discretion-
ary. Id. § 36.005. Briefly stated, the mandatory grounds are (1) lack of an impartial tribu-
nal, (2) lack of personal jurisdiction, or (3) lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
§ 36.005(a). The discretionary grounds for non-recognition are that the foreign action (1)
involved inadequate notice, (2) was obtained by fraud, (3) violates Texas public policy, (4)
is contrary to another final judgment, (5) is contrary to the parties' agreement (for exam-
ple, a contrary forum selection clause), (6) was in an inconvenient forum, or (7) is not from
a country granting reciprocal enforcement rights. Id. § 36.005(b). The UFCMJRA also
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awards, 160 child custody1 61 and child support. 162 Interstate and interna-
tional judgment recognition and enforcement offer fewer annual exam-
ples during this Survey period, 163 possibly a sign of the subject's
administrative nature that results in only a few reported cases. This Con-
flicts article will defer to the other topics in the Annual Survey for cover-
age of interstate and international child custody and child support issues.
provides for stays, id. § 36.007, and expressly reserves the right of enforcement of non-
money judgments under traditional, non-statutory standards, id. § 36.008. See generally
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (using comity as discretionary grounds for recognizing
and enforcing foreign country judgments).
160. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2006); Texas International Arbitration
Act, TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.082(f) (Vernon 2005).
161. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 152.001-.317 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
162. Id. §§ 159. 001-.901 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
163. Judgments from sister states include Enviropower, L.L.C. v. Bear Stearns & Co.,
Inc., No. 01-04-01111-CV, 2008 WL 456491, at *3-4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb.
21, 2008), on reconsideration, 2008 WL 483666 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 21,
2008, pet. filed) (upholding the enforcement of a New York judgment and applying New
York law to provisions for security); Playnation Play Sys., Inc. v. Guasjardo, No. 15-06-302-
CV, 2007 WL 1439740, at *4 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi May 19, 2007, no. pet.) (mem. op.
not designated for publication) (reversing the trial court's decision not to enforce a Geor-
gia judgment); Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Ward, Asel & Assoc., P.C., No. 05-05-01309-CV,
2006 WL 3291044, at *2.4 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 14, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (uphold-
ing the trial court's refusal to recognize an Ohio judgment for lack of jurisdiction there,
and affirming its decision not to allow discovery of jurisdictional facts in a judgment en-
forcement hearing); H. Heller & Co., Inc. v. La. Pac. Corp., 209 S.W.3d 844, 849-55 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (upholding the trial court's enforcement of
an Alabama judgment over the debtor's objections of lack of personal jurisdiction there).
Foreign country judgments include Duruji v. Duruji, No. 14-05001185-CV, 2007 WL
582282, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 21, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op. not
designated for publication) (affirming the trial court's refusal to recognize the husband's
Nigerian divorce decree in a Texas divorce action).
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